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Introduction:  
This chapter develops a conceptual approach which understands sentencing as  a collective 
practice which is generated by a number of actors, not only judges. Sentencing is seen as a 
series of decision making practices which are made visible in publicly available accounts. 
This way of seeing sentencing has significant implications for understanding conventional 
accounts of discretion. This chapter argues that discretion is best understood as a mode of 
justification based on trust in the invisible work of actors. Sentencing guidelines add a more 
visible, rule ±based form of accountability which does not replace discretion but works 
alongside it as a complementary mode of justification.  
 
1.0 The Discourse of  Individualised Sentencing  
Most of the literature on sentencing is written by scholars working within a legal paradigm 
concerned  to elucidate the formal legal status  of sentencing and with formulating proposals 
WRPDNHMXGLFLDOVHQWHQFLQJPRUH³ODZ-OLNH´$VKZRUWK5REHUWV)UDVH
The focus is understandably on the authoritative legal decision maker, the judge. Judges 
operate as independent individuals1. They are not bureaucrats whose task it is to implement 
government policy. They have no corporate voice nor corporate identity.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that sentencing is usually represented  as a decision making process carried out by 
                                                          
1 In political theory, judicial independence means that the judicial branch of government is independent from 
the executive and legislative branches. However many public law scholars (Ewing 2013 ) now accept that this 
theoretical  separation of law and politics is not sustainable in practice. Further, the fact that  the judicial 
branch is independent does not absolve individual judges of the responsibility for ensuring that appropriate  
attention is devoted to ensuring a measure of consistency in sentencing.  Sentencing policy,  in UK jurisdictions 
at least is made, de facto, by judicial sentencing practices. 
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an individual actor, a judge. Judges are the authoritative performers of sentencing. They are 
legally responsible for the allocation of sanctions. They are also acutely aware of the need to  
justify their decisions. Sentencing decisions need to be presented as just decisions2.  In their 
judgements, they frequently allude to their perceptions of the complexities of sentencing  
decision making, their  obligation  to consider all of the facts and circumstances of each 
individual case,  and the unique nature  of each case.  
The judge is often portrayed  as having  the lonely job of  deciding  what type and severity of  
sanction  is appropriate for a case. The judge has to reach a judgement about the seriousness 
of an offence, the harm it has caused and the appropriate penalty to achieve a range of aims, 
PDQ\RIZKLFKDUHFRQWUDGLFWRU\7KHGLVFRXUVHRI³LQGLYLGXDOLVHGVHQWHQFLQJ´DUJXHVWKDW
each case is unique and that a just sentence can only be reached by the consideration of the 
detailed facts and circumstances of each individual case.  Judges craft  a bespoke sentence 
which fits the distinctive  combination of facts and circumstances which make up the case 
DQGZKLFKJHQHUDWHVDVDQFWLRQZKLFKDFKLHYHVD³MXVW´VHQWHQFHThis at least is the view of 
sentencing presented by judges in the discourse of individualised sentencing3.  On this 
judicial  account of sentencing,  sentencers are held to exercise very wide discretion. 
Individualised sentencing  in non-guideline jurisdictions  and even in some jurisdictions with 
guidelines (Hutton 2013b, Frase 2013) is not governed by many rules.  
This discourse of individualised sentencing  provides both an empirical description of how 
judges perform their sentencing work, i.e. their decision making,  and  a normative account of 
what is to count aVD³MXVW´VHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQ7KHpractical and normative work used to 
generate sentencing decisions is variousl\GHVFULEHGDV³LQWXLWLYHV\QWKHVLV´5Y
Williscroft) , holistic craft work (Tata 2002)  RU³VXEMHFWLYHUDWLRQDOLWLHV´$DV7KH
public are invited to place their trust in the office of the judge. Judges are uniquely qualified 
to  deploy  these mysterious cognitive processes and thereby  to deliver just sentencing 
decisions.  On this account there  is no gap between the ideal of justice and the practice of 
justice.    
2.0 Sentencing as Collective Action 
This discourse of individualised sentencing struggles to explain the extent  of pattern and 
consistency found in sentencing, where there are few rules. How can the exercise of 
discretion by individual judges produce broad patterns of consistency in sentencing?  Does it 
make sense to understand sentencing decisions as being the product of the agency of 
individual judges? Or alternatively, are these decisions somehow generated by  neo-liberal 
ideology (Wacquant 2011), or by a Culture of Control (Garland, 2001) and if they are,  how 
do these structural explanations take effect at the level of courtroom sentencing decisions? 
                                                          
2 To say that sentencing decisions are justified by claiming that they are just is more than a little awkward. This 
ďĞŐƐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚĂƚĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞƐĂƚŝƐĨŝĞĚƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌ ?ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ? 
3 See this recent judgement of the High Court of Australia for a classic judicial articulation of individualised 
sentencing, PASQUALE BARBARO v THE QUEEN SAVERIO ZIRILLI v THE QUEEN [2014] HCA 2 
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Sociology has long grappled with the duality of agency and structure. To what extent  are 
actions determined by social structures and to what extent are they the product of individual 
agency?  Structuration theories (Giddens 1986, Archer 2003) are sophisticated  attempts to 
understand the interplay between these two levels. For Giddens, actions both reproduce 
existing structures and at the same time produce new structures. The aim is to avoid the stasis 
of over-deterministic structural theories while at the same time avoiding the loss of the idea 
of collective  action  which can be the result of an exaggerated focus on individual agency. 
%RXUGLHX¶VFRQFHSWRIKDELWXV+XWWRQLVDOso an attempt to deal with this conundrum 
by delineating a zone between agency and structure within which the two interact with each 
other, but how they do so is not clear. 
In this chapter, following the work of  Latour ( Latour 2005) sentencing is understood as 
collective action, as the product of the actions of human and non-human actors (Hutton 
2013a).  Sentencing is not exclusively a judicial function. The sentencing process starts at 
earlier stages of the criminal process (McConville et al 1991, Stenning 2008) and requires the 
work of other criminal justice practitioners and  the work of laws, professional rules, 
guidelines or memoranda,   professional standards, formal templates and other documents 
designed to shape the practices of criminal justice professionals (see Bastard and Dubois 
2015 this volume).  Conventionally,  human actors would be conceived as using, referring to, 
implementing or  applying  these documents. However, these documents make a difference in 
the world independently of the actions of human agents. Often, in the language of structural 
sociology, these non-human agents are seen as either  providing resources for human actors 
or as constraints to the  freedom of actors to do otherwise. However this is to privilege human 
agency as being the originator of action. It pre-VXSSRVHVWKDWLIWKH³FRQVWUDLQWV´ZHUHQRW
there, human actors would act differently. ,WLPSOLHVWKDWZLWKRXWWKHVH³WKLQJV´VRFLDOOLIH
would be otherwise. This may be  WUXHEXWZKDW³RWKHUZLVH´ZRXOGLWEH"1RWWKH random 
maverick preferences of individuals. Individual agency does not pre-exist the world in which 
individual agents operate. The social world is generated by the interactions of people and 
things,  E\ZKDW3LFNHULQJKDVFDOOHG³WKHGDQFHRIDJHQFLHV´3ickering 1995 in Cooren et al 
2006). This is another metaphor for the relationship between structure and agency, but this 
time the duality is scrapped. The search for the source of agency is halted. Understanding the 
production of social life is achieved by the empirical study of the exercise of agency by both 
human and non-human actors. 
7KHZRUNRIVHQWHQFLQJPD\EHGHVFULEHGDVDSURFHVVRI³TXDOLILFDWLRQ´WKDWLVa process 
of deciding whether a report of an event ±in-the-world  belongs to a legitimate  category:  
whether WKHUHSRUWHG³XQLTXH´HYHQWqualifies as an example of some general class. 
Qualification is a means of moving from the particular to the general and the criminal justice 
process is a means of moving from a unique-event-in the-world to a case which can proceed 
in court and from there to a sentence to be administered. 
³RSHUDWLRQVRITXDOLILFDWLRQDOVRFRQVWLWXWHWKHEDVLFFRJQLWLYHRSHUDWLRQVRIVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQ
social coordination requires a continuous effort of comparison, agreement on common terms 
DQGLGHQWLILFDWLRQ´ (Boltanski and Thevenot (2006)p1)  
4 
 
What does sentencing look like from this vantage point?  What can we see of the dance of 
agencies? The answer is that we can see the documents which are generated in the process of 
constructing a case. This begins with police officers and criminal law and ends with the 
release of the offender from obligations imposed by penal sanctions. Sentencing is thus 
continuous with the criminal justice process itself. The sentencing judge is presented with a 
case file containing specific pieces of information, prepared by other criminal justice actors to 
fulfil their professional and legal obligations (Hawkins 2003). So although a sanction is 
allocated to a unique individual citizen, sentencing is based on the information contained in 
the case file. Police officers generate a file containing information about the alleged offence, 
RIIHQGHUZLWQHVVHVDQGRWKHUHYLGHQFH7KLVILOHLVVHQWWRWKHSURVHFXWRU¶VRIILFHZKHUHD
decision is made about prosecution and further material added to the file.  By the time it 
reaches the  court,  the case is  a file of documents4  which presents discrete pieces of 
information about  the offence and the offender. In order for the case to proceed through the 
criminal justice process, certain legal requirements have to be met. A criminal offence has to 
be identified, evidence  that the offence has occurred and that the offender committed the  act 
has to be assembled etc.  7KHFRPSLODWLRQRID³FDVH´FDQEHVHHQDVWKH production of  a 
series of documents. Each document enables  movement to the next stage of the process.  
Criminal justice professionals process  information into existing classifications which provide 
them with an account which serves their professional purposes, for example, to  demonstrate 
that the criteria for establishing a criminal offence have been satisfied,  to ensure that the  
rules of evidence and procedure have been correctly complied with, to demonstrate that social 
work practice guidelines have been followed.  These are all forms of public justification for 
their decision making. The unique event in the world becomes a series of defensible accounts 
which form a more or less familiar criminal case. The work of professionals can be seen as a 
series of visible translations  from the particular  unique  event-in the world  to a criminal  
case, which shares much in common with other cases. So the case documentation can be seen 
as a series of accounts which provide a public justification for decisions taken which can be 
checked and verified. The case is the outcome of a series of decisions and it is the only 
YLVLEOHDFFRXQWZHKDYHRIWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVVHV$V+DZNLQVQRWHV³SDVWGHFLVLRQV
DUHXVHGDVUDZPDWHULDOIRUSUHVHQWGHFLVLRQV´+DZNLns 2003 p198).  
The construction of the case carries with it an unavoidable sentencing function. By the time 
the case reaches court, the sentencing options are significantly narrowed because the unique 
event-in the world has now been translated through a series of decision making processes  
into  a more or less typical sort  of case. The research reported in McNeill et al (2009)  shows 
how social enquiry reports are written for the courts by social workers5. The report writers are 
                                                          
4 >ĂƚŽƵƌŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐŽƌĨŽƌŵƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůůŝĨĞ ? ?ĂĨŽƌŵŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇ
something  which allows something else to be transported from one site to another. Form then becomes one 
ŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚǇƉĞƐŽĨƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ?>ĂƚŽƵƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
5 Social Enquiry Reports are now known as Criminal Justice Social Work Reports following the Criminal Justice 
and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. There is a revised template for social workers to complete. These changes 
accompany the introduction of a single community sanction, the Community Payback Order, to replace the 
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required to comply with national standards for the production of reports which prescribe a 
format and style. Within these strictures there is scope for social workers to both second 
guess judicial decision makers and try to influence the judicial decision by their use of 
language.  However there was evidence that social workers developed a sense of the 
appropriate sentence for the case, a decision usually made on the basis of a  routine 
assessment of the seriousness of the case and the record of the offender. There was scope in 
some cases to seek to nudge the court towards what might seem like an unlikely non-
custodial sentence where the social workers felt there was scope to work with an offender 
with a long criminal record but also occasions where the social worker felt that there was 
simply no scope to work with an offender who was almost certain to receive a custodial 
sentence.  The account provided in the SER performs a significant part of the work of 
sentencing. It is a further translation of the prosecution case into an account which is clearly 
focussed on a relatively narrow range of potential  sentencing outcomes. 
:KDWWKHGLVFRXUVHRILQGLYLGXDOLVHGVHQWHQFLQJGHVFULEHVDV³Xnique´HYHQWVLQWKHZRUOG
comprised of a singular set of facts and circumstances are translated into more or less routine 
criminal offences defined by particular pieces of evidence. Judges have no unmediated access 
to  ³ZKDWUHDOO\KDSSHQHG´. All they have is the information which has been presented to 
them in the documentation ( and to what was said in court6).  An offender will usually appear 
in court and may in some circumstances give evidence or make a personal statement but more 
commonly most of the information about the offender will come from reports contained in 
the case file (van Oorschot, 2014). These professional practices  generate  an element  of 
consistency in sentencing0RVWUHJXODUFRXUWSUDFWLWLRQHUVZLOOKDYHDVHQVHRI³WKHJRLQJ
UDWH´IRUW\SLFDORIIHQFHVDOWKRXJKWKLVLVDOZD\VWDFLWDQGLPSRVVLEOHWRPHDVXUH (as in non-
guideline jurisdictions at least, there is no benchmark against which to distinguish warranted 
from unwarranted disparity). 
If this sociological account of sentencing decision making is correct, it presents a challenge to 
the discourse of individualised sentencing  and  to conventional understandings of judicial 
discretion.  
3.0 Discretion  and Practice  
Individualised sentencing is held to involve the exercise of wide discretion by judges. But 
what does discretion mean? It is often taken to refer to the practice of sentencing decision 
making, that is,  to the cognitive processes exercised by judges. However, if sentencing 
decision making is not solely performed by judicial actors, but is more accurately conceived 
as  a form of collective action described above, then discretion is not only exercised by 
judges but by all of the other actors involved in the decision making processes. In practice,  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
previous range of community options. The essential functions  of the report, to provide information for the 
court and advice on the appropriate requirements of the order remain much the same. Evaluation of these 
reforms is currently in progress. 
6 Where a trial has taken place, there will be much more oral communication available to the judge which will 
provide a richer narrative about the offence and the offender. However this case file will continue to structure 
the event and the offender into a more or less typical example of  a criminal case. 
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the extent of discretion  available to judges is much more constrained than the discourse of 
individualised sentencing would suggest. This chapter argues that discretion should be  
understood as a mode of accountability, that is,  as a way of justifying sentencing decisions, 
rather than a way of describing the practice of decision making ( Lipsky 1980).    
Gelsthrope and Padfield quote the definition of discretion from the Oxford English 
Dictionary, 
 ³WKHOLEHUW\RUSRZHURIGHFLGLQJDFFRUGLQJWRRQH¶VRZQMXGJHPHQWRUGLVFHUQPHQW´
(Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003 p 3) 
7KLVGHILQLWLRQUHIHUVWRWKH³OLEHUW\RUSRZHU´DYDLODEOHWRDGHFLVLRQPDNHU,QRWKHUZRUGV
this is a political  and legal capacity:  the capacity and/or authority to make a decision without 
providing an account based on demonstrating adherence to rules. Discretion then might be 
thought of as the absence of a requirement to refer to rules in the provision of an account of a 
decision making process.  In other words, discretion is not the exercise of judgment itself, but 
the capacity or power to do so. Discretion operates  in the space famously described as the 
³KROHLQWKHGRXJKQXW´E\5RQDOG'ZRUNLQ Decisions made within the doughy substance of 
the doughnut need to be justified by reference to rules. Decisions made in the space in the 
middle which is not governed by rules, are justified  by reference to the exercise of 
professional discretion.  In this space, accountability for the exercise of judgment rests on 
trust in the office of the decision maker, which  in sentencing  is the judge. 
However, Gelsthorpe and Padfield identify another way of conceptualising discretion. They  
argue that  the implementation of rules necessarily  involves the interpretation of both facts 
and rules. This process of interpretation involves the exercise  of discretion.  So discretion 
and rules are not distinctive modes of accountability as Dworkin argued, but rather seen by 
Gelsthorpe and Padfield as decision making practices which are much harder to distinguish 
one from the other.  
Hawkins also  uses the term discretion to describe the practices  performed by legal actors to 
³WUDQVODWH´ZRUGVLQWRDFWLRQV  
³7RXQGHUVWDQGEHWWHUKRZODZZRUNVKRZWKHZRUGVRIODZDUHtranslated into action, it is 
HVVHQWLDOWRNQRZKRZOHJDOGLVFUHWLRQLVH[HUFLVHG´+DZNLQVSP\HPSKDVLV 
There is a difference between conceiving of discretion as a legal capacity  and discretion as 
an interpretive  practice.  These are not the same things.  When describing discretion  as an 
interpretive practice,  Gelsthorpe and Padfield refer to discretion as  the difference between 
³WKHIRUPDOSRVLWLRQDQGWKHDFWXDOSUDFWLFH´ In other words, discretion helps to understand 
WKHZD\LQZKLFKODZ³LQWKHERRNV´LVWUDQVODWHGLQWRDFWLRQVLQWKHZRUOGWRXVH+DZNLQV¶
terminology.  
How can we research these practices? How can we find out how laws are implemented or 
how rules are put into practice? We can look at the outcomes of practices: the cases which 
have been compiled, the decisions which have been made, the reports which have been 
written, the judgements which have been delivered etc. We can also interrogate the decision 
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makers, report writers and case compilers and ask them about their perceptions of  their 
actions. The interrogations focus on the meanings expressed by the actors. We try to see the 
social world which they are creating through their eyes. We are interested in how the actors 
make sense of  both the rules and the facts and how they perceive themselves applying rules 
to facts to reach decisions.  
 ³«ZKHUHODZ\HUVWKLQNLQWHUPVRIWKHUROHRIOHJDOUXOHVLQDFKLHYLQJRXWFRPHVVRFLDO
VFLHQWLVWVWHQGWRWKLQNUDWKHULQWHUPVRIGHFLVLRQJRDOVRUGHFLVLRQSURFHVVHV´+DZNLQV
1992 p14.)  
From a social science perspective,  rules do not by themselves generate particular practices.   
+DZNLQVTXRWHV/HPSHUW³UXOHVDUHQRWLQH[RUDEO\LQIOXHQWLDO´+DZNLQVS7KDW
is, actors are not always oriented to rules when they act. For example, police officers may 
perceive a need to resolve a problem of disorder. They do not see themselves as 
implementing the law so much as solving a problem in a legitimate fashion.  They need to be 
able to provide an account of their actions that is lawful.  Rules are a means of generating  an 
account which justifies the choice of a decision maker.  
To return to the idea of sentencing as collective action, the  documents produced by actors at 
each stage of the process can be seen as accounts which justify their decisions by reference to 
the relevant  rules/templates/memoranda/codes of practice etc by which their decisions are 
held accountable. All of these actors exercise discretion in both of the senses identified by 
Gelsthorpe and Padfield.  They interpret rules and fact situations and  make judgements about 
whether or not rules apply to the facts and if so how they should be applied. They also 
generate documents which provide legitimate justifications  for  their decisions. These are 
different but neither are accurate accounts of  their decision making practices. They are 
different forms of justificatory accounts. 
4.0 Visible and Invisible work: The generation of accounts 
 ³,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRUHFRJQLVHWKHH[LVWHQFHRILQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRIthe 
V\VWHPWKDWWKHµRXWSXW¶RIRQHVWDJHSURYLGHVWKHµLQSXW¶IRUDQRWKHU««´%RWWRPOH\
in Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003 p11)) 
³1RZRUNLVLQKHUHQWO\YLVLEOHRULQYLVLEOH:HDOZD\V³VHH´ZRUNWKURXJKDVHOHFWLRQRI
LQGLFDWRUV«´6WDUUDQG6WUDXVV1999 p9) 
Starr and Strauss make the apparently obvious  observation that social scientists have no un-
mediated access to the cognitive processes of actors.  The work performed by actors is only 
visible through the traces that they leave behind. So the decisions made by police officers 
about arrest and charge are visible in the reports which they file, the decisions of prosecutors 
are made visible in the case files they prepare for court, the  decisions of judges are made 
visible in the sentences which they pass (see also Tata 2002).  
This is true of all social action. Action is not immediately visible, it is only made visible 
through its products. We see decisions, but not decision making. We see reports but not the 
processes which were used to produce these reports. Our access to these invisible processes is 
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only gained through the accounts provided either by observers or by the actors themselves. 
2EVHUYHUV¶ accounts are external perceptions, actors¶ accounts are post hoc narratives which 
may be their best good faith efforts in explaining their actions or may be 
justifications/idealisations/rationalisations. However they should not be taken as objectively 
accurate descriptions of cognitive processes because actors do not have access to the methods 
by which their decisions are reached,  only to stories of these processes. This does not mean 
that the accounts are not useful, just that they are not necessarily accurate. So   invisible work  
is necessarily invisible. There are good reasons for its continued invisibility. There are limits 
to our capacity for knowledge of the world. Requiring the production of accounts cannot 
make all invisible work visible. It makes new public accounts visible, but leaves invisible 
work un-accounted for.  
:HFDQQRW³NQRZ´KRZDFWRUV make decisions because we do not have direct access  to their 
cognitive processes only to their accounts of their actions.  As described above, sentencing 
decisions are generated by  a chain of what Latour (2005) calls translations. Accounts are 
generated to move from one stage in the chain to another. These accounts are produced to 
satisfy a range of demands on professional decision makers. Legality is one of these demands 
but it is not so much the demand to produce any particular legal outcome as the need to 
ensure that an account is lawful. If work  is invisible, then all we can do is trust the 
professional competence of the worker. If, however, it becomes visible, these visible traces 
are available as an account of the work and our trust can be founded on this account. 
,QWKHSURGXFWLRQRID³FDVH´for the court, some elements of the work of criminal justice 
practitioners have  been made visible, other elements remain invisible.  Some information has 
been included and some excluded. The judge has no access to the invisible work of 
practitioners nor to information  that has been excluded.  The judge makes a decision on the 
basis of the material presented to the court. So criminal justice practitioners  participate in 
sentencing through their work in constructing a criminal case file.  Routine cases will  
frequently generate  a routine decision, more or less predictable to regular court actors.  
While  there is always,  in formal legal terms, scope for the judicial decision maker to diverge 
from the going rate, this is likely to happen relatively infrequently. Where a report has been 
prepared for the court recommending a community sanction,  much of the sentencing work 
has already been performed by the report writer. Although the court is of course not legally 
obliged to follow the recommendation of the report, recommendations will be followed in a 
substantial majority of cases7.   In other words,  sentencing decisions are the product of the 
work of a number of criminal justice actors performing  their routine bureaucratic tasks 
within the  cultural frame of the local courtroom.  
5.0 Invisible Work and Accountability 
                                                          
7 Hawkins (2003) gives an interesting example from the work of Padfield, et al (2003) of  how routine 
bureaucratic decisions of one agency ( the Prison Service) have an impact on the future decisions of another 
agency (the Parole Board). Decisions made by the Prison Service  which allocated prisoners to open conditions 
appeared to have an influence on Parole Board decisions. The Parole Board released no prisoner who was not 
in open conditions, and only one prisoner who was in open conditions was not released by the Parole Board. 
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Much of the work which goes into sentencing is invisible.  For example, in Scotland, a 
Criminal Justice Social Work Report (CJSWR) is prepared through the completion of a 
standardised template and must contain prescribed  items of information.   However it also 
conceals invisible professional judgements made by the report writer, for example, about the 
³VXLWDELOLW\´RI the offender for a particular community sanction (McNeill et al 2009).  The 
sentencing decision of the judge is invisible in the sense that the propriety or justice of the 
sentence is asserted on the basis of a narration of relevant facts and circumstances. None of 
WKH³ZRUNLQJVRXW´,  so to speak, are made visible.   
It is tempting to call this invisible work, holistic or craftwork (Tata 2007). The difficulty with 
this is that it tends to exaggerate the influence of individual cognitive work on sentencing 
outcomes. It is as if the individual judge somehow exists outside of the social context of 
sentencing. That the judge, as it were,  begins the sentencing decision making process afresh,  
assessing information as if this information has not already been processed by other actors.  
Sentencing is seen as purely a matter of individual cognitive work. 
Another form of explanation  attributes  routine sentencing practices  to the judicial habitus 
(Hutton 2006).  Habitus is a metaphor which allows the analyst to avoid awarding causal 
priority to either structure or action and thereby avoids the stasis of either structural or 
individual determination.  However a more fundamental problem with the metaphor is that it 
retains the split between structure and agency. The approach proposed  here  develops a 
sociological analysis of sentencing. That is not to say that sentencing decision making does 
not involve cognitive processes, nor to deny that individual judicial characteristics or values  
may have an impact on judicial sentencing practices. A sociological  approach argues that 
sentencing is not reducible to matters of personality or cognition. It argues that sentencing is 
collective  action, that is,  the shared work of actors, human and non-human,  engaged in  
criminal justice processes.  The visible evidence of this work are the files produced by 
criminal justice practitioners which provide public justifications for their decision making.   
Most of the time, these processes generate routine decisions and there is modest scope in 
practice for judges to stray from the going rate. Of course, the ³JRLQJUDWH´LVQHLWKHUIL[HG
nor objective and in any given court culture it will accommodate a range or possible 
variations. There will also be cases which do not fit comfortably into routine categories.  
However these are questions for empirical investigation and in the absence of agreed 
sentencing guidelines, it is very difficult to establish a benchmark against which variation in 
sentencing can be measured. 
Phenomenological or interpretive accounts of discretion are important (Tombs and Jagger 
2006, Jamieson 2013). They provide us with accounts of how judicial actors understand and 
explain their sentencing practice.  These accounts  are generated to justify particular decision 
choices.  Hawkins calls these naturalistic accounts.  They challenge the goal ±directed 
rational choice  approach to understanding decision making. A naturalistic approach focuses 
on the moral or symbolic meanings held by actors, and on how information is framed and 
interpreted. However these accounts are not necessarily accurate accounts of the cognitive 
processes through which sentencing outcomes are generated. They tend to  exaggerate the 
role of the individual judge and conceal the collective practices of sentencing. 
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Sentencers may describe their individual cognitive processes DV³KROLVWLF´EXWWKLVVKRXOGEH
understood as their account of their thinking and not as an objectively accurate description of 
cognitive processes. Judges interpret more or less familiar accounts presented in court papers 
and translate  these into the next stage of the criminal process which is a sentencing decision. 
+DZNLQV¶ naturalistic approach de-centres the individual from an understanding of decision 
making but there remains a focus on trying to describe the production of actions rather than  
the production of accounts.  
6.0 Individual differences in judicial sentencing 
This does not mean that there is no scope for individual differences between judges ( tough or 
lenient, retributive or rehabilitative etc) , that sometimes similar cases are treated differently 
and different cases treated similarly, that for certain classes of case, for example those around 
the custody threshold, there is more scope for variation and unpredictability, but it means that 
there is considerably less scope than the conventional  discourse of individualised sentencing  
would suggest. 
Attempts to generate more predictable sentencing decisions  by the proliferation and narrower 
specification of rules will produce more elaborate justificatory accounts which demonstrate 
that the processes defined by the rules have been observed and performed. The rules may or 
may not be successful in generating particular actions by decision makers, but all we will 
know is that legitimate accounts have been produced to justify the outcomes. The outcomes 
may or may not be closer to those desired by the rule makers (if it is possible to determine 
their desired goals). This, however, is an empirical question.  
The argument here is that rules produce not actions but justificatory accounts for actions. So 
rules produce a process or formal version of justice rather than a substantive account. 
Decisions in the criminal justice system proceed through the construction of accounts. These 
accounts are performed by actors. These actors need to ensure that their accounts can be 
defended against potential criticism by some supervising agency whether this be their line 
manager, their colleagues,  or other agents in the system with whom they have to work i.e.  
those who use their accounts to perform their own work in the criminal process. They will be 
aware to at least some extent that they need to be able to demonstrate that their decisions are 
compliant with the guidance which regulates their work and ultimately with law. They may 
or may not see themselves as implementing law, more likely they see themselves as 
generating accounts which are not unlawful.  The extent to which their decision making is 
oriented towards implementing a legal rule is an empirical question but we should not assume 
that actors working in a legal context necessarily orient their actions towards implementing 
the letter of the law, even where from an external perspective it seems to observers that 
implementing law is the essence of their job. So police officers engage with an event which 
may require their intervention to restore or maintain public order/perceptions of safety. Their 
focus is on solving a problem and generating an account of their conduct which provides a 
legitimate justification for their actions. 
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In a non-guideline regime,  using the method of individualised sentencing, the judicial 
decision simply expresses the  propriety of the sentence for the case at hand and makes no 
reference as to how the case may  be similar or indeed different from other cases. As with 
sentencing under a guidelines approach, cognitive actions and normative judgements are not 
made visible. Much of the impetus behind the sentencing reform movement which began in 
the United States in the 1970s (Frankel 1974) was a desire to make sentencing decisions more 
visible and therefore more accountable. Sentencing guidelines are a means of injecting 
accountability by establishing a relatively simple  form of calculability which enables an 
account of consistency to be articulated.  Visibility of sentencing work can only be generated 
through the production of these sorts of accounts. Criminal justice actors engaged in the 
process of generating a case could be required to produce  different accounts of their decision 
making. These accounts will produce a different  type of visibility, but still leave invisible 
that work for which no methods have been designed to generate visibility. In other words 
some sentencing work will always be invisible because it can only be made visible through 
the generation of accounts and accounts  are always partial. This partiality is a problem for 
law which  desires certainty. Individualised sentencing is one way of delivering certainty, but 
it is certainty based on a claim for authority in the office of judge who asserts the propriety of 
the sentence.  Guidelines shift some of this authority to the abstract system of guidelines,  so 
certainty comes from visible work which allocates a case to a classification  or not and 
invisible work which places the case at a particular position on the range within the guideline 
(or departs from the guideline with reasons). Individualised sentencing and Sentencing 
Guidelines produce two different sorts of justificatory accounts for sentencing. Individualised 
sentencing claims justification  based on trust in the invisible work performed by the office of 
judge. Sentencing Guidelines share this element of trust, but add to it, a claim for justification 
based on a public account of an acceptable range of variation within which judges are 
entrusted to exercise judgement. 
Conclusion: Rules, discretion and  the regulation of sentencing practice. 
0DUWKD)HOGPDQDVNV³+RZFDQGHFLVLRQVEHUHVSRQVLYHWRWKHUHOHYDQWIHDWXUHVRIDFRQWH[W
without being ad hocXQV\VWHPDWLFRULQFRPSUHKHQVLEOH"´LQ+DZNLQVS 
Sentencing is a process which is constructed out of a series of accounts of decision making by 
criminal justice practitioners.  Each of these accounts is a justification for the presentation of 
a particular framing of an event in the world to meet professional and legal requirements of 
the construction of a criminal case.  Each account addresses the problem posed by Feldman. 
Each account  produces a visible record of work that was used to generate the account.   
Much invisible work is involved in the decision making processes of criminal justice actors. 
This is the exercise of  discretion.   Formal accounts make work visible, the work of 
discretion is invisible.  Law does not regulate practice it regulates accounts of practice. We 
can only have access to  accounts of practice and to the outcomes of practice, we cannot have 
access to the  internal cognitive processes of individual decision makers. 
Regimes of calculation  cannot make everything visible. Beyond visibility lies the invisible. 
In sentencing,  the decision is where accountability ends and trust begins. How much of an 
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account of sentencing choice is it appropriate to make visible  and how much should remain  
a matter of invisible judgement?  The degree of desired visibility is a matter of political 
choice and contest. 
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